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Industrial Policy and Competition†
By Philippe Aghion, Jing Cai, Mathias Dewatripont, Luosha Du,  
Ann Harrison, and Patrick Legros*
Using a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large enterprises 
in China between 1998 and 2007, we show that industrial policies 
allocated to competitive sectors or that foster competition in a 
sector increase productivity growth. We measure competition using 
the Lerner Index and include as industrial policies subsidies tax 
holidays, loans, and tariffs. Measures to foster competition include 
policies that are more dispersed across firms in a sector or measures 
that encourage younger and more productive enterprises. (JEL L11, 
L25, L52, O14, O25, O47, P31)
In the aftermath of World War II, several developing countries opted for “indus-trial policies” aimed at promoting new infant industries or at protecting local 
traditional activities from competition by products from more advanced countries. 
However, these policies came into disrepute in the 1980s mainly on the grounds that 
industrial policy prevents competition and allows governments to pick winners (and, 
more rarely, to name losers) in a discretionary fashion, thereby increasing the scope 
for capture of governments by vested interests.
In this paper, we argue that properly governed sectoral policies, in particular sec-
toral policies that are competition-friendly, may enhance productivity and produc-
tivity growth. Without industrial policy, innovative firms may choose to operate in 
different sectors in order to face lower competition on the product market, leading to 
high sectoral concentration and low incentives to innovate because of a “monopoly 
replacement effect.” In such a case, industrial policies that encourage firms to be 
active in the same sector, such as through tax holidays or other tax subsidy schemes, 
will decrease concentration in the targeted sector and enhance incentives for firms to 
innovate. Therefore there can be complementarity between competition and suitably 
designed industrial policies in inducing innovation and productivity growth.
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cn); Harrison: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 2016 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, 
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To document the potential complementarity between competition and industrial 
policy, we use a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large enterprises in China 
between 1998 and 2007 and consider the effect of industrial policies on firm-level 
productivity growth. Our main finding is that when sectoral policies are targeted 
toward competitive sectors or allocated in such a way as to preserve or increase 
competition, then these policies increase productivity growth. We measure competi-
tion using the Lerner Index and include as industrial policies subsidies, tax holidays, 
loans, and tariffs. Competition-friendly policies are defined as targeting that is more 
dispersed across firms in a sector or measures that encourage younger and more 
productive enterprises.
Our paper relates to a whole literature on the costs and benefits of industrial pol-
icy. First are the infant-industry models advocating government support to sectors 
with potential economy-wide knowledge externalities, but with high initial produc-
tion costs that decrease only progressively over time as a result of  learning-by-doing: 
the idea is that these sectors need to be protected against foreign competition in the 
short run until they become fully competitive (see, for example, Greenwald and 
Stiglitz 2006).1 The infant industry argument has been challenged, both theoret-
ically (the “pick-winners” argument) and empirically. For example, Krueger and 
Tuncer (1984) analyzed the effects of industrial policy in Turkey in the 1960s, and 
“showed” that firms or industries not protected by tariff measures were character-
ized by higher productivity in growth rates than protected industries.2 However, 
none of these papers look at the design or at the governance of industrial policy.
Most closely related to our analysis is the paper by Nunn and Trefler (2010). 
Using cross-country, industry-level panel data, they analyze whether, as suggested 
by “infant industry” arguments, the growth of productivity in a country is posi-
tively affected by tariff protection biased in favor of activities and sectors that are 
“ skill-intensive,” that is to say, use more intensely skilled workers. They find a sig-
nificant positive correlation between productivity growth and the “skill bias” due 
to tariff protection. As the authors point out though, such a correlation does not 
necessarily mean there is causality between skill bias due to protection and produc-
tivity growth: the two variables may themselves be the result of a third factor, such 
as the quality of institutions in countries considered. However, Nunn and Trefler 
(2010) show that at least 25 percent of the correlation corresponds to a causal effect. 
Overall, their analysis suggests that adequately designed (here, skill-intensive) tar-
geting may actually enhance growth, not only in the sector that is being subsidized, 
but in other sectors as well. The issue remains whether industrial policy comes at the 
1 For an overview of infant industry models and empirical evidence, see Harrison and Rodríguez-Clare (2009). 
The infant industry argument could be summarized as follows. Consider a local economy that includes both a tra-
ditional sector (especially agriculture) and an industry in its infancy. Production costs in industry are initially high, 
but “learning by doing” decrease these costs over time, even faster as the volume of activity in this area is high. In 
addition, increased productivity, which is a consequence of this learning by doing phase, has positive spillovers on 
the rest of the economy, i.e., it increases the potential rate of growth also in the traditional sector. In this case, a total 
and instantaneous liberalization of international trade can be detrimental to the growth of the local economy, as it 
might inhibit the activity of the local industry whose production costs are initially high: what will happen in this 
case is that the local demand for industrial products will turn to foreign importers. It means that learning by doing 
in the local industry will be slowed itself, which will reduce the externalities of growth from this sector towards the 
traditional sector. 
2 However, see Harrison (1994) who shows that their results are not robust to rigorous statistical analysis. 
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cost of a lowering of competition, e.g., between high and low skill-intensive sectors 
or within a high-skill sector. As we show in this paper, industrial policy in the form 
of targeting may in fact take the form of enhancing competition in a sector, and 
serves the dual role of increasing consumer surplus and growth. 
The paper is organized as follows. In Section I we sketch a simple model to guide 
our empirical analysis.3 In Section II we present some brief historical background 
for industrial policy in China, as well as the data and measurement and some raw 
correlations between competition, industrial policies, and firm level performance. 
We describe in Section III the estimation methodology and presents the main empir-
ical results. We conclude in Section IV.
I. The Theoretical Argument
In this section, we sketch our theoretical argument for why properly designed 
sectoral policy may enhance rather than harm competition. The argument can be 
summarized as follows: consider an economy where two firms can either differen-
tiate horizontally or innovate to improve their productivity. Under laissez-faire the 
two firms will typically choose to diversify, i.e., to produce in different sectors in 
order to escape competition between them. Forcing (or encouraging) these firms 
to operate in the same sector and on an equal footing will induce them to resort to 
vertical innovation (i.e., to productivity-improving innovation) in order to escape 
competition with each other. This in turn will foster productivity growth.
Note that this argument is quite distinct from the infant-industry argument and 
is also novel in the literature on the effects of industrial policy. In particular it does 
not rely on learning-by-doing externalities or on knowledge externalities between 
an industrial (tradable good) sector and a traditional (non-tradable good) sector. 
Instead, it relies on standard growth externalities and on an escape-competition 
effect (see, for instance, Aghion et al. 2005). Thus, while (foreign) competition 
is damaging for domestic growth in the infant-industry model, here competition is 
always growth-enhancing.
A. Basic setup
We consider a two-period model of an economy producing two goods, denoted 
by  A and  B . Denote the quantity consumed on each good by  x A and  x B . The repre-
sentative consumer has income equal to  2E and utility  log ( x A ) +  log ( x B ) when 
consuming  x A and  x B . This means that if the price of good  i is  p i , demand for good  i 
will be  x i = E/ p i . To simplify the writing, we assume that  E = 1 throughout this 
paper.4
Production can be done by one of two “big” firms  1, 2, or by “fringe firms.” 
Fringe firms act competitively and have a constant marginal cost of production of 
c f , whereas firms  j = 1, 2 have an initial marginal cost of  c , where  1 >  c f ≥ c . 
3 The details of the model as well as the proofs are developed in Appendix B. 
4 As soon will be apparent, the rate of innovation is linear in  E , and except for this size effect, what matters for 
the analysis are the ratios  E/c and  E/ c f . 
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The assumption  c f ≥ c reflects the cost advantage of firms  1, 2 with respect to the 
fringe, and the assumption  1 > c ensures that equilibrium quantities can be greater 
than  1 . Marginal costs are firm-specific and are independent of the sector in which 
production is undertaken.
Firms can improve productivity through quality-improving innovation. For sim-
plicity, we assume that only firms  1, 2 can innovate. Innovation reduces production 
costs, but the size of the cost reduction is different between the two sectors  A and  B . 
Without loss of generality, we assume that in sector  A, innovations reduce produc-
tion costs from  c to  c/ γ A = c/(γ + δ) , whereas in sector  B they reduce costs from 
c to  c/ γ B = c/(γ − δ), where  γ − δ > 1 or  δ < γ − 1 .5
We also make the simple assumption that, with equal probability, each firm can 
be chosen to be the potential innovator. To innovate with probability  q this firm must 
incur effort cost  q 2 /2 . This is like saying that each firm has an exogenous proba-
bility of getting a patentable idea, which then has to be turned into cost reduction 
thanks to effort exerted by the firm.
Finally, we assume Bertrand competition within each sector unless the two lead-
ing firms choose the same sector and collude within that sector. Let  φ be the prob-
ability of the two leading firms colluding in the same sector when they have the 
same cost, and let us assume that when colluding the two firms behave as a joint 
monopoly taking the fringe cost  c f as given. In this case, the expected profit of each 
leading firm with cost  c <  c f is  φ  1 _2  
 c f − c
 ____ c f  since, when collusion fails, firms compete 
Bertrand.
B. the Effects of targeted tax/subsidies
Firms can choose to be active in different sectors or in the same sector: we refer 
to the first situation as one of diversity, and the second as one of focus. Under focus, 
both firms choose the better technology  A . Under diversity, one firm (call it firm 1) 
chooses  A and the other (call it firm 2) chooses  B (this is a coordination game and 
which firm ends up with technology  A is random). Diversity is stable if the firm 
ending up with technology  B does not want to switch to technology  A ; otherwise the 
equilibrium is focus. Conditional on this choice firms then decide to invest in order 
to innovate.
We look at how firms’ choices whether to produce in the same sector or in differ-
ent sectors, and their resulting innovation intensities, depend upon industrial policy. 
For industrial policy we will focus on interventions based on taxes or subsidies that 
are proportional to profit levels, that is, on tax levels  t A ,  t B per profit level in sec-
tors  A, B , respectively, where  t k < 0 is a subsidy and  t k > 0 is a tax.6 We restrict 
5 Even if  δ = 0 , that is, if the two sectors are similar, industrial policy is beneficial. In previous versions of 
the paper we considered imperfect information about the identity of the high growth sector, and our results were 
qualitatively similar. This suggests that a regulator does not need necessarily to identify the “high growth” sector in 
order to implement the type of industrial policy we are considering. 
6 We assume without loss of generality an initial level of taxation equal to zero in each sector. 
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 attention to the case where there is perfect information about  γ i and where the profit 
is net of the cost of innovation.7
We first derive the equilibrium choices under arbitrary tax/subsidy schemes 
 t A ≤  t B (“laissez-faire” corresponds to the case  t A =  t B = 0 ) , and show the 
interaction between our measure of competition  φ and the growth rate that can be 
achieved via such a tax system. We then identify the growth-maximizing tax/sub-
sidy scheme when the planner is subject to a budget constraint.
Considering the laissez-faire situation with  t A =  t B = 0 , firms will choose 
focus only if the equilibrium profit is greater than the lowest profit obtained under 
diversity. This will be the case only if the degree of competition is not too high; 
hence, the stronger competition as measured by ( 1 − φ ), the higher the range of  δ s 
for which firms will choose diversity.
PROPOSITION 1: there exists a cutoff value  δ F (φ) , a decreasing function of  φ, 
such that focus is the industry equilibrium if and only if  δ ≥  δ F (φ) .
Now, let us introduce a system of tax/subsidies, and let us use as a measure of 
targeting the ratio
(1)  τ ≡  1 −  t A  _____
1 −  t B . 
The larger  τ is, the higher are the “tax holidays” in sector  A with respect to sector  B . 
It should be clear that  τ is sufficient to characterize the incentives of firms to choose 
between diversity or focus. Alternatively,  τ is a measure of the asymmetry in tax 
holidays between the two sectors. The effect of the tax ratio on industry equilibrium 
is summarized in the following result.
COROLLARy 1: Consider a system of tax/subsidies with a targeting ratio 
τ =  1 −  t A  ____1 −  t B . When  τ > 1 , there exists a cutoff  Δ(φ, τ) <  δ F (φ), such that the 
firms choose focus in equilibrium whenever  δ > Δ(φ, τ). Moreover this cutoff is 
decreasing in  τ and in  φ .
Hence, a larger target ratio  τ increases the range of values of  δ for which there 
will be focus. Alternatively, if  δ <  δ F (φ) , there exists a targeting tax  τ , such that 
δ = Δ(φ, τ) ; because  Δ(φ, τ) is a decreasing function of  τ , the lower the value of 
δ , the higher this value of  τ should be.
Now solving for the optimal innovation investments, respectively under focus 
and under diversity, we obtain the complementarity between the degree of competi-
tion in a sector and the effectiveness of a tax/subsidy scheme.
7 If the tax/subsidy is on the profit gross of the cost of innovation, then it will also affect the rate at which 
firms innovate. A reduction in the tax rate on gross profits has a similar effect as a subsidy to the marginal cost of 
innovation. 
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PROPOSITION 2: An effective  τ -industrial policy has a bigger effect on per capita 
GDP and on innovation intensity in more competitive industries.
C. Predictions
The following predictions from the above theoretical discussion will guide our 
empirical analysis in the next sections:
•	 A	tax	policy	that	is	more	targeted	toward	sector		A has a bigger impact on output 
and innovation: a higher value of  τ (that is a lower  t A with respect to  t B ) makes 
it more likely that focus will be the industry equilibrium. By Proposition 2, it 
follows that higher values of  τ have a larger effect on innovation and on the 
level of per capita GDP, independently of  φ .
•	 Since	a	policy	 that	gives	a	 tax	holiday	 to	only	one	firm	will	not	modify	 the	
industry equilibrium, tax holidays that are common to the two firms have a 
bigger impact on innovation and the level of per capita GDP than a policy that 
would apply to a unique firm.
•	 There	is	complementarity	between	industrial	policy	through	tax	holidays	and	
the degree of competition.
II. Background, Data, and Measurement
A. Background
The Chinese government has long been actively involved in promoting industrial-
ization in China. Industrial policy relies on a whole range of instruments, including 
tariff protection, low interest loans, tax holidays, and subsidies for the purpose of 
promoting investment in key sectors. We begin by documenting the range of indus-
trial policies and their changes over the sample period. Readers interested in more 
detailed descriptions of China’s changing industrial policies over the sample period 
are referred to Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2014) or Harrison (2014).
The first row of Table 1 reports the percentage of firms that received positive 
subsidies from the government. In 1998, 9.4 percent of all reporting firms received 
subsidies. That number climbed steadily during the sample period, reaching a high 
of 15.1 percent of all manufacturing firms in 2004, before falling to 12.4 percent 
in 2007. The number was even higher for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and for-
eign firms (many of which formed joint ventures with SOEs), but lower for domes-
tic firms with no public or foreign participation. For private domestic enterprises 
(“Domestic Private Only” in Table 1), the share of firms receiving subsidies was 
slightly lower, increasing from 8 percent of all firms in 1998 to a high of 13.8 per-
cent in 2004, before falling to 11.6 percent in 2007.
The second row of Table 1 indicates the percentage of firms receiving tax hol-
idays over the sample period. We define a firm as receiving a tax holiday if either 
the firm paid less than the statutory corporate income tax rate in that year or if the 
firm paid less than the statutory value-added tax rate. A large share of manufacturing 
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firms paid less than the full statutory rate during the sample period. The share of 
enterprises with tax holidays varies from 41.6 percent in 1998 to nearly 50 percent 
in 2007. Comparing the incidence of tax holidays across different types of enter-
prises, Table 1 shows that the incidence was lowest for SOEs and highest for firms 
with foreign equity participation. Up to 59 percent of foreign firms received some 
type of tax holiday in 2003, compared to only 36.5 percent for SOEs.
While low interest loans have been an important form of industrial policy in 
China, we do not have data on directed credit provided through state banks or local 
governments. However, firms do report total interest and current liabilities, so we 
can calculate an effective interest rate on loan obligations. We report those averages 
in the third row of Table 1. The average ratio of interest paid to current liabilities 
across all firms with nonzero interest or liabilities was 5.57 percent in 1998. The 
interest ratio steadily declined during the sample period, to a low of 2.7 percent in 
2004, and then increased to 3.3 percent in 2007. Across different ownership cate-
gories, there was significant variation, with domestic private enterprises facing an 
effective interest rate that was almost double that faced by SOEs.
In the last row of Table 1 we report the average tariff on imports by year for 1998 
through 2007. Since tariffs are set nationally by sector, there is not significant varia-
tion in tariffs across enterprise types. During the sample period, average tariffs came 
down dramatically, from an average of 20 percentage points in 1998 to an average of 
10 percentage points in 2007. By contrast, average tariffs in the United States over 
the last several decades have been less than 5 percent. The largest drop in tariffs 
occurred in 2001, the year China joined the WTO.
Table 1—Summary Statistics
1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007
All companies
 Percent of firms with subsidies 0.0937 0.110 0.115 0.129 0.138 0.151 0.137 0.124
 Percent of firms with tax holidays 0.416 0.453 0.441 0.443 0.456 0.419 0.454 0.497
 Ratio of interest payments to 
  current liabilities
0.0557 0.0413 0.0366 0.0340 0.0319 0.0268 0.0313 0.0330
 Average tariff on imports 19.48 18.68 13.84 13.58 12.23 10.91 10.17 10.12
SOEs only
 Percent of firms with subsidies 0.139 0.162 0.171 0.181 0.197 0.197 0.224 0.253
 Percent of firms with tax holidays 0.306 0.355 0.334 0.343 0.365 0.337 0.367 0.455
 Ratio of interest payments to 
  current liabilities
0.0416 0.0288 0.0255 0.0238 0.0222 0.0184 0.0183 0.0200
 Average tariff on imports 19.81 19.11 13.76 13.48 12.05 11.01 10.24 10.24
Foreign firms only
 Percent of firms with subsidies 0.0678 0.0839 0.103 0.133 0.154 0.181 0.146 0.142
 Percent of firms with tax holidays 0.540 0.591 0.572 0.585 0.593 0.577 0.598 0.608
 Ratio of interest payments to 
  current liabilities
0.0408 0.0282 0.0249 0.0219 0.0198 0.0164 0.0185 0.0198
 Average tariff on imports 21.29 19.83 14.65 14.41 12.99 11.45 10.68 10.45
Domestic private firms only
 Percent of firms with subsidies 0.0835 0.105 0.107 0.119 0.126 0.138 0.131 0.116
 Percent of firms with tax holidays 0.418 0.431 0.417 0.412 0.421 0.374 0.413 0.467
 Ratio of interest payments to 
  current liabilities
0.0668 0.0491 0.0424 0.0391 0.0365 0.0304 0.0356 0.0368
 Average tariff on imports 18.65 18.14 13.58 13.33 12.00 10.74 10.00 10.02
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Table 2 reports average industrial policies across two-digit manufacturing sectors 
between 1998 and 2007. There was significant variation in the intensity of indus-
trial policy across different subsectors. For example, the ratio of interest payments 
to current liabilities, our proxy for the (subsidized) interest rate facing the enter-
prise, was very low for the computer and telecommunications sector, averaging 1.8 
percent, but significantly higher for nonmetallic minerals (4.6 percent), beverages 
(4.4 percent), and paper products (4.4 percent). Tariffs also show significant disper-
sion, with the highest tariffs on goods such as tobacco products (over 52 percent) 
and transport equipment (17 percent) and the lowest tariffs on wood products (7.6 
percent) and fuels (6 percent). The percentage of firms receiving subsidies and tax 
holidays also varied across sectors, as reported in the last two columns of Table 2.
B. Data and Measurement
We measure industrial policy using four types of policy instruments: subsidies, 
interest paid as a share of current liabilities, tax holidays, and tariffs. Subsidies, 
interest payments, and tax holidays are allocated at the firm level, while tariffs are 
set at the national level. Our data for tariffs are available at the two or three digit 
level. Tariffs are set nationally and are exogenous with respect to a particular region 
Table 2—Industrial Policies by Sector
Sector Interest rate Tariff Subsidies Tax holidays
Foodstuff 0.0424 21.67 0.109 0.476
Manufacture of beverages 0.0441 27.48 0.106 0.451
Manufacture of tobacco 0.0336 52.28 0.229 0.320
Manufacture of textiles 0.0357 14.39 0.120 0.444
Manufacture of textile wearing apparel, footwear 0.0256 20.32 0.101 0.492
Manufacture of leather, fur 0.0308 18.17 0.0959 0.486
Processing of timber, manufacture of wood, bamboo 0.0578 7.557 0.114 0.548
Manufacture of furniture 0.0397 8.776 0.0923 0.501
Manufacture of paper and paper products 0.0438 10.60 0.105 0.454
Manufacture of articles for culture, education, and 
 sport activity
0.0230 11.99 0.126 0.474
Processing of petroleum, coking, processing of 
 nuclear fuel
0.0391 6.046 0.106 0.388
Manufacture of raw chemical materials and 
 chemical products
0.0391 9.513 0.145 0.452
Manufacture of medicines 0.0391 6.148 0.166 0.468
Manufacture of chemical fibers 0.0381 8.743 0.166 0.426
Manufacture of rubber 0.0376 15.66 0.116 0.455
Manufacture of plastics 0.0323 11.45 0.107 0.451
Manufacture of nonmetallic mineral products 0.0462 12.38 0.139 0.445
Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals 0.0367 6.193 0.109 0.413
Smelting and pressing of metals 0.0397 5.602 0.160 0.433
Manufacture of metal products 0.0293 12.15 0.107 0.432
Manufacture of special purpose machinery 0.0288 9.112 0.138 0.419
Manufacture of transport equipment 0.0289 17.57 0.150 0.413
Manufacture of electrical machinery and equipment 0.0266 11.67 0.144 0.423
Manufacture of communication equipment, 
 computers, and other electronic equipment
0.0182 7.081 0.155 0.538
Manufacture of measuring instruments and 
 machinery for cultural activity and office work
0.0205 9.442 0.170 0.470
Manufacture of artwork and other manufacturing 0.0344 17.03 0.102 0.485
VoL. 7 no. 4 9aghion et al.: industrial policy and competition
or a particular firm. However, since tariffs do not vary across firms, we cannot use 
measures of policy dispersion within a sector to test whether tariffs are set in a 
way that preserves competition. For tariffs, all we can do is test whether the impo-
sition of tariffs in more competitive sectors is more likely to result in higher firm 
performance.
To measure competition, we will compute a Lerner Index at both the county and 
sector level. The Lerner Index measures the importance of markups (the difference 
between prices and marginal costs) relative to the firm’s total value-added. To cal-
culate it, we first aggregate operating profits, capital costs, and sales at the industry, 
county, and year level. The Lerner Index is defined as the ratio of operating profits 
less capital costs to sales. Under perfect competition, there should be no excess 
profits above capital costs, so the Lerner Index should equal zero. Since the Lerner 
Index is an inverse measure of competition, we redefine competition as 1–Lerner, so 
under perfect competition it should equal  1 . A value of  1 indicates perfect compe-
tition, while values below  1 suggest some degree of market power. We address the 
potential endogeneity of competition using initial period Lerners in all the estimat-
ing equations below.
The standard approach to measuring firm-level performance is to identify total 
factor productivity (TFP) levels or growth. Since TFP is an overall efficiency param-
eter, it is best understood as measuring process innovation—the cost reduction 
associated with improving the efficiency in producing an existing product. Another 
measure of innovation is product innovation—associated with the introduction of 
new products or higher quality goods. Our primary focus is on process innovation, 
since product innovation is not reliably measured and was also less pervasive for 
firms in the sample during this period.
The dataset, collected by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, is described 
in greater detail in Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2012). We retain only the manu-
facturing enterprises and eliminate establishments with missing values or negative 
or zero values for key variables such as output, employees, capital, and inputs. The 
years covered include 1998 through 2007. This is a true panel, following the same 
firms over time. We dropped three sectors with incomplete information on prices 
from the sample.8 The final sample size is  1,545,626 observations.
The dataset contains information on real and nominal output, assets, number of 
workers, renumeration, inputs, public ownership, foreign investment, sales revenue, 
and exports. Because domestically owned, foreign, and publicly owned enterprises 
behave quite differently, in all the regression results presented below we will restrict 
the sample to firms that have zero foreign ownership and have only minority state 
ownership. In the dataset,  1,069,563 observations meet the criterion.9
To control for the effects of trade policies, we have created a time series of tariffs, 
obtained from the World Integrated Trading Solution (WITS), maintained by the 
World Bank. We aggregated tariffs to the same level of aggregation as the foreign 
8 They are the following sectors: processing food from agricultural products; printing, reproduction of recording 
media; and general purpose machinery. 
9 Typically we distinguish domestic and foreign-invested firms based on whether the share of subscribed capital 
owned by foreign investors is equal to or less than  10 percent . The results are generally robust to the choice of 
definition for foreign versus domestic ownership. 
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investment data, using output for  2003 as weights. During the sample period, aver-
age tariffs fell by nearly  9 percentage points, which is a significant change over a 
short time period. While the average level of tariffs across all years was nearly  13 
percent, this average masks significant heterogeneity across sectors, with a high of 
41 percent in grain mill products and a low of  4 percent in railroad equipment.
Before adopting a more formal approach to analyzing the relationship between 
industrial policy, competition, and firm-level outcomes in the next section, we first 
report some raw correlations in Table 3. The remainder of the paper will focus only 
on domestically owned firms, but for the correlation results we include all enter-
prises in order to highlight the significant differences across ownership types. All the 
reported correlations are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In particular 
these correlations indicate: (i) that firms receiving subsidies exhibited higher total 
factor productivity levels; (ii) that subsidies were significantly associated with new 
product introductions; (iii) that while subsidies and tax holidays are significantly 
and positively correlated with firm-level innovation, final goods tariffs are not; and 
(iv) that higher levels of TFP are positively correlated with firm-level subsidies and 
tax holidays; however, the two other industrial policy measures are negatively cor-
related with firm-level performance as defined by levels of TFP: final goods tariffs 
and low interest payments.
The raw correlations also confirm that SOEs and foreign firms behave quite dif-
ferently from other enterprises. Industrial policies were also allocated differently for 
these enterprises, consistent with the evidence presented in Tables 1 and 2. Public 
sector enterprises were more likely to receive subsidies and tariff protection, but 
less likely to receive tax holidays. Public ownership was negatively associated with 
TFP, with a correlation coefficient of −0.19. These correlations are consistent with 
the perception of SOEs as less competitive and less efficient than other enterprises. 
Firms with foreign ownership (column 7) were systematically more likely to receive 
all types of industrial support. In contrast to SOEs, foreign ownership is positive 
and significantly correlated with TFP. The very different performance outcomes 
and industrial policy targeting for SOEs and foreign firms justify our decision to 
focus on domestically owned enterprises with only minority public ownership in the 
remainder of this paper.
Overall, these correlations suggest that some forms of industrial policy, such as 
subsidies and tax holidays, were associated with significant firm-level innovation, 
while others, such as tariffs, which typically discourage competition, were not. Our 
empirical analysis in the next section will confirm these conjectures.
III. Empirical Analysis and Results
In this section, we analyze the complementarity between industrial policy and 
competition using two approaches. First, we test the hypothesis that introducing 
industrial policies in more competitive sectors is more likely to lead to improved 
outcomes. This is a somewhat different approach from “picking winners:” instead, 
this approach suggests picking sectors where firms already compete intensively. 
The intuition would be that to make government support effective, it needs to be 
allocated where there is competition, and not collusion. Second, for given sectoral 
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choice, we investigate what would be the best strategy for allocating support across 
firms within a sector. In a nutshell, the first approach explores differences across 
sectors, whereas the second approach explores how best to allocate industrial policy 
support within a sector.
A. Estimation Methods
To implement our first approach, which tests Corollary 1, we measure the cor-
relation of subsidies with competition and then see whether a stronger correlation 
coefficient at the city-year level raises firm performance. To measure whether subsi-
dies are biased toward more competitive sectors in city  r in year  t , we calculate the 
correlation between the industry-city level initial degree of competition and current 
(period  t ) subsidies in sector  j and city  r :
(2)  Ω rt, subsidy = Corr(sUBsID Y rjt , CoMPEtItIo n rj0 ) .
Since all industrial policies vary over time, we thus obtain a time-varying change 
in the correlation between initial levels of competition in year zero and the patterns 
of interventions across different parts of China. We then explore whether higher cor-
relations between current period subsidies and initial competition, as measured by 
Ω rt, subsidy , are associated with better performance. As an illustration, if in Shanghai 
the largest amount of subsidies are allocated to sectors with low markups, and small 
or zero subsidies are given to sectors with high markups in the year 2003, then, for 
Shanghai in 2003, this correlation coefficient will be close to unity.
Similarly, we introduce the variables  Ω rt, interest and  Ω rt, tax , where
(3)  Ω rt, interest = Corr(IntErEs t rjt , CoMPEtItIo n rj0 )
(4)  Ω rt, tax = Corr( tAX rjt , CoMPEtItIo n rj0 ) .
Table 3
Index_ 
subsidy
Index_ 
tax
Index_ 
interest
Final  
tariff TFP_OP Public Foreign
New 
product 
share in 
sales
Index_subsidy 1
Index_tax −0.0047 1
Index_interest −0.0248 −0.0087 1
Final goods tariff −0.0373 −0.0113 −0.016 1
TFP_OP 0.0275 0.108 −0.0106 −0.118 1
Public 0.0418 −0.0679 0.0344 0.142 −0.19 1
Foreign 0.0116 0.146 0.0821 0.0529 0.152 −0.16 1
New product share in 
 sales
0.109 −0.0021 −0.0523 −0.037 0.0489 0.0728 −0.0034 1
notes: Index_subsidy, index_tax, and index_interest are dummy variables that equal one if a firm receives subsidies, 
tax breaks, or a below-median borrowing interest rate, respectively. TFP is estimated with the Olley-Pakes method. 
For the OP estimation of TFP, we use a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we use the OP regression method to 
obtain estimates for the input coefficients and then calculate TFP (the residual from the production function). In the 
second stage, we regress TFP on the remaining controls. Ownership variables public and foreign vary from 0 to 100 
percent publicly or foreign owned.
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The only type of industrial policy that does not vary across regions is tariffs, but the 
Ω variable for tariff policies will still vary by location and year because the compo-
sition of industrial sectors is different, and the degree of competition varies across 
regions. Consequently, we can compute a separate  Ω variable by replacing subsidies 
with tariffs and replacing the correlation between initial competition and subsidies 
with the correlation between initial competition and current period tariffs. At the 
city level, the correlation between that city’s degree of competition at the beginning 
of the sample period and current period tariffs should be strictly exogenous, as the 
level of competition is predetermined and tariffs are set at the national, not the city, 
level. Our last correlation measure is now defined as
(5)  Ω rt, tariffs = Corr(tArIF F jt , CoMPEtItIo n rj0 ) .
Consequently we have four different correlation coefficients that vary only across 
locations and over time. These  Ω variables measure a city’s scope to target more 
competitive sectors where competition is predetermined using beginning of period 
Lerner indices.10  To calculate our measure of competition, we first aggregate oper-
ating profits, capital costs, and sales at the industry level. Under perfect competition, 
there should be no excess profits above capital costs, so the Lerner Index should 
equal zero and the competition measure should equal  one . A value of  one indicates 
perfect competition, while values below  one suggest some degree of market power.
Our second goal is to identify which approaches to allocating industrial support 
within a given sector are most effective. Our main empirical challenge is to capture 
the notion of firm-specific industrial support being allocated in a way that preserves 
or increases competition. We first consider the sectoral dispersion of industrial sup-
port as a measure of the degree of competitiveness. As an (inverse) measure of 
sectoral dispersion, we use the Herfindahl index constructed using the share of sup-
port each firm in a given sector receives relative to the total support awarded to the 
sector. We thus derive a measure of concentration, such as  Herf _ subsidy , which for 
subsidies is given by
(6)  Herf _ subsid y ijrt =  ∑ 
h∈j, h∉i
 ( subsid y  ijrt  __________  sum _ subsid y  jrt ) 
2 .
We then do the same thing for tax holidays, and obtain a measure of concentra-
tion,  Herf _ tax , where
(7)  Herf _ ta x ijrt =  ∑ 
h∈j, h∉i
 ( taxHolida y  ijrt   _____________ sum _ taxHolida y  jrt  ) 
2 .
The amount of tax holiday granted to any firm  i is simply the quantity of tax rev-
enues that the firm saves by qualifying for the tax holiday. During the time period 
of our analysis, corporate tax rates varied from 15 to 33 percent. Consequently, 
the amount of the tax holiday is equal to profits times the tax rate less actual taxes 
paid, plus any savings from exemptions to the value-added tax (which was set to 17 
10 Recall that the Lerner index is defined as the ratio of operating profits less capital costs to sales. It is an inverse 
measure of product market competition. 
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 percent of value-added). If the statutory tax rate facing an enterprise was 20 percent, 
then we calculate the tax holidays as the difference between profits multiplied by 20 
percent and actual taxes paid. The results are robust to choice of statutory tax rate 
(i.e., the top 33 percent rate versus a lower rate).
As with standard Herfindahl indices, a smaller number indicates a higher 
degree of dispersion of subsidies or tax holidays, or a more equitable (and 
 competition-preserving) allocation of those across firms in the sector. We then take 
the 1 – these Herfindahl indexes to capture the degree of sectoral dispersion of the 
tax holidays or subsidies. The  1 −  Herf _ subsidy term, we call  CompHerf _ subsidy . 
The  1 − Herf _ tax term, we call  CompHerf _ tax . To the extent that greater disper-
sion of subsidies within a sector induces greater focus by encouraging more firms to 
innovate within a specific sector, we would expect the coefficient on that variable in 
the productivity regression to be positive.
We also compute an analogous measure for loans. Since it is difficult to know 
what portion of loans are low interest, we identify by sector and year the mean inter-
est rate paid. We compute industrial support as the difference between mean interest 
rates paid in a sector and actual interest paid by firms for those enterprises paying 
lower rates. To the extent that firms in a particular sector and region are unable 
to access capital, we would expect a more concentrated distribution of subsidized 
interest payments.
If we were to regress firm-level measures of total factor productivity (TFP) on 
these sectoral dispersion measures, such an approach could raise potential endoge-
neity issues. For example, if governments favor large and more successful firms in 
the allocation process, then a firm that accounts for a large share of total tax holi-
days or subsidies within a sector might also exhibit higher TFP. These would lead 
our estimation procedure to reflect spurious relationships between state support and 
performance. A similar possibility exists if the government tends to support weaker 
enterprises, which could bias the coefficient in the opposite direction.
To address the potential endogeneity of our policy instruments, we calculate them 
separately for each firm and exclude the firm’s own industrial support (subsidies, tax 
holidays, interest payments) in estimating our Herfindahl measures. This means that 
in calculating  1 − Herf _ subsidy , we exclude firm  i ’s subsidy in both the numerator 
and the denominator. For the inverse of the  Herf _ tax or the  Herf _ int erest , we do the 
same exclusion. Consequently, this sector-level measure is exogenous with respect 
to firm  i ’s performance.
Combining our  Ω s, which measure the links between sectoral targeting and ini-
tial competition at the local level, and our Herfindahl indices, which measure the 
dispersion of industrial policy, the basic estimating equation can then be written as 
follows, where  m indicates an industrial policy type:
(8)  ln tF P ijrt =  θ 1  Z ijt +  θ 2  s jt +  β m CompHer f imjrt +  α m  Ω mrt +  ℓ i +  d t +  ϵ ijt ,  
where  Z is a vector of firm-level controls including state ownership at the firm level. 
Although we are excluding 100 percent state-owned enterprises from the analysis, 
many so-called private firms retain some degree of state participation. The variable 
s includes sector-level controls, such as tariffs or the degree of (initial) competition 
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in the sector, or the degree of foreign penetration in the sector, as well as upstream 
and downstream foreign investment.11
 CompHer f imjrt is a vector of industrial policies that measures the extent of sec-
toral dispersion in subsidies, tax holidays, and interest payments. The specification 
includes firm fixed effects  ℓ i as well as time fixed effects  d t . Our conjecture is that α m > 0, i.e., that industrial policies targeted toward sectors with higher competi-
tion as measured by the Lerner Index in the initial year of the sample are more TFP 
enhancing. We also conjecture that  β m is likely to be positive if the distribution of 
industrial policies targets innovators or promotes more competition. We explore dif-
ferent possible targeting schemes in our analysis below.
B. Baseline results
We begin with the baseline estimates from (8). The critical parameters are the 
coefficients on the vector of industrial policies  α m and  β m . Table 4 reports the coeffi-
cient estimates. The dependent variable is the log of TFP, using both the  Olley-Pakes 
(OP) method and OLS with firm-level fixed effects to compute input shares in the 
first stage as a comparison. Our OP approach follows Olley and Pakes (1996) in 
calculating sector-specific input coefficients in the first stage and is described in 
more detail in an online Appendix. As indicated earlier, all specifications include 
both time and firm fixed effects. We also include as controls different sector-level 
measures of foreign presence, but do not report them in Table 4.
More Dispersed Intervention Is More tFP-Enhancing.—To the extent that 
greater dispersion of subsidies within a sector induces greater focus by encouraging 
more firms to innovate within a specific sector, we would expect the coefficient on 
CompHerf to be positive. This is precisely what we obtain in the first row of Table 4, 
which shows positive and significant coefficients on  CompHerf for subsidies. The 
coefficient estimates in column 1 indicate that a perfectly dispersed set of subsidies, 
leading to a Herfindahl for subsidies of 0 and consequently the complement of that 
at 1, would increase TFP by 3.9 percentage points.
The coefficient on  Ω rt, subsidies indicates the extent to which targeting at the city 
level via subsidies is more efficient in more competitive industries, as measured by 
the initial degree of competition at the beginning of the sample period. The coeffi-
cient estimates are reported in the second row of Table 4. While the coefficient is 
positive across all specifications, it is not significantly different from zero.
Together, the first two rows of Table 4 indicate that while allocating subsidies to 
initially more competitive sectors did not significantly affect productivity, a greater 
dispersion of subsidies was associated with improved firm performance. Later 
we will explore how moving beyond equitable allocations of subsidies to target-
ing innovative firms could further increase the positive impact of firm subsidies on 
performance.
11 For more discussion of the measures of foreign presence, which include measures for horizontal (“horizon-
tal”) and vertical (“backward” and “forward”) foreign exposure, see Du, Harrison, and Jefferson (2012). 
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The next row of Table 4 looks at the correlation between firm-level TFP and our 
measure for the dispersion of tax holidays  CompHerf _ tax . The coefficient is sta-
tistically significant and positive, indicating that greater dispersion of tax holidays 
increases productivity. The coefficient estimate, which varies from 0.086 to 0.103, 
indicates driving the Herfindahl for the dispersion of tax holidays on income taxes 
Table 4—Competitiveness of Industrial Policies and Firm Productivity
TFP_OLSFE TFP_OP
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)   (5) (6) (7) (8)
CompHerf_subsidy 0.0388*** 0.0305*** 0.0407*** 0.0319***
(0.00976) (0.00824) (0.0110) (0.00918)
Cor_subsidy_lerner 0.00225 0.000959 0.00115 0.00009
(0.00348) (0.00397) (0.00338) (0.00394)
CompHerf_tax 0.0999*** 0.0859*** 0.103*** 0.0861***
(0.0207) (0.0230) (0.0229) (0.0249)
Cor_tax_lerner −0.0143*** −0.0151*** −0.0152*** −0.0161***
(0.00396) (0.00421) (0.00417) (0.00458)
CompHerf_interest 0.0766*** 0.0568*** 0.0845*** 0.0669***
(0.0169) (0.0164) (0.0195) (0.0190)
Cor_interest_lerner 0.0133*** 0.0124*** 0.0126*** 0.0122***
(0.00399) (0.00450) (0.00389) (0.00445)
Cor_tariff_lerner −0.0411*** −0.0208** −0.0330*** −0.0305** −0.0312** −0.0163 −0.0281*** −0.0199
(0.0143) (0.00975) (0.00995) (0.0147) (0.0145) (0.0101) (0.0104) (0.0149)
Lerner 10.63** 9.349*** 9.404*** 10.26** 12.98** 9.099** 9.396** 12.05*
(4.712) (3.449) (3.417) (4.535) (6.320) (3.677) (3.677) (6.102)
Lernersquare −6.141** −5.362*** −5.413*** −5.953** −6.963** −4.927** −5.108** −6.464*
(2.591) (1.898) (1.886) (2.493) (3.458) (2.060) (2.066) (3.344)
Exportshare_sector 0.328** 0.370*** 0.346** 0.343** 0.632*** 0.683*** 0.651*** 0.660***
(0.141) (0.139) (0.139) (0.141) (0.178) (0.175) (0.175) (0.178)
Stateshare 0.00293 5.35e-05 −0.000432 0.00301 0.00310 −0.000412 −0.000588 0.00315
(0.00470) (0.00428) (0.00399) (0.00504) (0.00481) (0.00425) (0.00397) (0.00514)
Index_subsidy 0.0116*** 0.0110*** 0.0116*** 0.0105*** 0.00805*** 0.00759*** 0.00833*** 0.00674***
(0.00181) (0.00170) (0.00168) (0.00190) (0.00193) (0.00187) (0.00185) (0.00199)
Index_tax 0.0220*** 0.0201*** 0.0218*** 0.0205*** 0.0214*** 0.0197*** 0.0213*** 0.0200***
(0.00104) (0.000951) (0.000906) (0.00108) (0.00103) (0.000897) (0.000873) (0.00103)
Index_interest −0.0129*** −0.0142*** −0.0157*** −0.0120*** −0.0109*** −0.0124*** −0.0139*** −0.0101***
(0.00163) (0.00144) (0.00148) (0.00169) (0.00187) (0.00164) (0.00167) (0.00192)
lnTariff 0.0716 0.0619 0.0626 0.0690 0.0527 0.0416 0.0449 0.0476
(0.0579) (0.0556) (0.0556) (0.0576) (0.0570) (0.0551) (0.0549) (0.0565)
Constant −2.876 −2.378 −2.398 −2.776 −4.500 −2.655 −2.794 −4.154
(2.196) (1.627) (1.607) (2.133) (2.945) (1.696) (1.690) (2.858)
Observations 810,740 903,455 962,076 746,304   810,740 903,455 962,076 746,304
r 2 0.205 0.205 0.205 0.208   0.181 0.183 0.182 0.184
notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable is TFP (estimated by OLS with fixed 
effects in columns 1, 2, 3, 4; estimated by Olley-Pakes method in columns 5, 6, 7, 8). For the OP estimation of TFP, it’s indeed a 
two-stage estimation. In the first stage, we use the OP regression method to obtain estimates for the input coefficients and then cal-
culate TFP (the residual from the production function). In the second stage, we regress TFP on the remaining controls. Each regres-
sion includes firm fixed effects and year dummies. CompHerf_subsidy, CompHerf_tax, and CompHerf_interest are Herfindhal 
indices of subsidy, tax, and interest rate policies, measured on the city-industry-year level. Corr_subsidy_lerner, corr_tax_lerner, 
and corr_tarriff_lerner are constructed by the correlation between the industry-city level initial degree of competition (represented 
by lerner index) and the current period of subsidies, taxes, and interest rates; all the correlations are on the city-year level. Each 
regression includes industry fixed effect and year dummies. Export share is calculated by export procurement divided by industrial 
sales. State share is defined as the proportion of the firm’s state assets to its total equity. Those two shares are aggregated at the sec-
tor-year level. Index_subsidy, index_tax, and index_interest are dummy variables that are equal to one if a firm receives subsidies, 
tax breaks, or a below-median borrowing interest rate, respectively. Sector-level FDI and other (input) tariffs are also included as 
controls but not reported.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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and value-added taxes to 0 would lead to an increase in TFP of 8.6 to 10.3 percent-
age points.
The coefficient estimate on the correlation between taxes and initial competition 
Ω rt, tax at the city level in column 1, equal to  −0.0143 , indicates that if the correlation 
between tax holidays and competition at the city level was perfect ( 100 percent), 
then productivity would be 1.43 percent higher. Based on the sample means, a 1 
standard deviation increase in the city-industry correlation would increase TFP by 
0.3 percentage points for firms in that city and industry.
The fifth row of Table 4 reports the impact of wider dispersion of interest pay-
ments for loans on productivity outcomes. The coefficient on the Herfindahl for 
interest payments is positive and significant across all specifications, indicating that 
a wider dispersion of subsidized interest payments is consistent with higher produc-
tivity at the firm level. The coefficient estimate varies from 0.057 to 0.085, indicat-
ing that a perfectly disperse set of interest payments would be associated with higher 
productivity by 5.7 to 8.5 percentage points. A 1 standard deviation increase in the 
variable would be associated with a 1.2 to 1.6 percentage point increase in TFP.12
While the first three columns of Table 4 report the effects of different indus-
trial policies separately, column 4 combines all of them in one specification. The 
coefficient estimates are unaffected. The results in column 4 indicate that a more 
equitable dispersion of subsidies, tax holidays, and interest payments across firms 
within a sector are unequivocally associated with higher productivity growth at the 
firm level. While a higher level of subsidies or tax holidays are associated with 
higher productivity in initially competitive sectors, the results are mixed or negative 
for loans and tariffs. We shall see below that the positive effects at the city level of 
subsidies and tax holidays, and the mixed role of tariffs and low interest loans, are 
consistent with their individual effects at the firm level.
robustness.—The coefficient estimates when using OP to estimate TFP are 
reported in the last four columns of Table 4. Consistent with reviews of the produc-
tivity literature, the results are not very different when using OP estimates of TFP 
versus OLS with firm fixed effects. One difference is that the coefficient on the cor-
relation of tariffs and initial competition becomes insignificant, but remains negative 
with an attenuated coefficient.
The remaining part of Table 4 reports the coefficients on the sector- and firm-level 
controls. At the sector level, competition measured using  1 − Lerner is positively 
and significantly associated with increased TFP. We also include a squared term, 
and the coefficient is negative. This nonlinear relationship between competition and 
productivity, which is increasing at lower levels and falling at higher levels, is con-
sistent with the inverted U-shape found in particular by Aghion et al. (2005). If, 
12 While the first five rows of Table 4 suggest potentially significant positive effects of industrial policies, these 
are not uniform. In particular, the correlation between interest payments and competition is positive, suggesting 
improved TFP when effective interest rates are higher in more initially competitive sectors. Similarly, the correla-
tion between tariffs and competition in the sector is negative, indicating that tariff interventions in more competitive 
sectors have been associated with lower TFP. The coefficient estimate, which ranges from −0.0199 to −0.0411, 
suggests that if higher tariffs were perfectly correlated with higher initial competition, then TFP would be from 2 
to 4 percentage points lower. 
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instead, we measure competition using sectoral export shares, we also find a signifi-
cant and positive association with TFP. This strong, positive, independent impact of 
competition, measured using either the sector-level Lerner Index or export shares, 
is consistent with an important role for competition in enhancing firm performance.
One question that might arise is the potential endogeneity of the Lerner Index and 
its square, which are included as controls. We address the potential endogeneity of 
the correlation and Herfindahl measures by explicitly excluding the own firm in the 
calculations, and using initial period Lerners to construct the correlations. For the 
Lerner control measures, endogeneity is also unlikely to be a problem as we use the 
initial period Lerner measure in that location and sector. Using Lerner measures as 
controls that were calculated at the beginning of the sample period mitigates possi-
ble reverse causality between firm behavior, sectoral productivity distributions, and 
market structure.
We also include controls for subsidies, tax holidays, tariffs, and low interest 
loans at the individual enterprise level. We include a zero-one control variable, 
index _ subsidy , which is equal to one if the enterprise received nonzero and positive 
subsidy amounts in that year. We also include a zero-one control indicating whether 
the firm received tax holidays,  index _ tax . The tax break is defined as a zero-one vari-
able indicating whether the firm paid either taxes at a lower rate than the statutory 
corporate tax rate or value-added taxes at a lower rate than the statutory rate. The 
coefficients on the subsidy and tax holiday dummies are positive and significant. We 
also include a control for loans, which is equal to one if the firm’s interest payments 
to current liabilities (an effective interest rate) are below the average for that sec-
tor and year. The coefficient on the index_interest term is negative and significant. 
Firms that receive lower interest rates do not perform better when performance is 
measured using TFP. These results for loans as an industrial policy measure are 
consistent with the coefficients on the industry-city correlations, indicating better 
performance at the city level when interest payments are higher.13
summarizing.—Overall, the results in Table 4 suggest that preserving competition 
through a more equitable targeting policy is associated with superior performance, 
as measured by productivity. We addressed the potential endogeneity of targeting by 
excluding a firm’s own subsidies or tax holidays when estimating the impact of sec-
toral dispersion of subsidies or tax holidays on that firm’s TFP. Overall, the evidence 
suggests that instruments such as tax holidays and subsidies have systemically been 
associated with improved productivity performance when combined with high ini-
tial levels of competition, as measured by the Lerner Index.
One interesting question to ask is how much actual tariff and subsidy levels at 
the city-industry level were in fact correlated with actual competition levels. The 
summary statistics in Table A1 in the Appendix suggest that in fact the Chinese 
13 The impact of tariffs depends on where they are allocated. While final tariffs facing a sector are positively 
associated with TFP, the effect is not statistically significant. Higher tariffs in input or using sectors have negative 
effects on firm TFP. These insignificant or negative effects of tariff protection on firm-level TFP are consistent with 
our results showing that even if tariffs are targeted at more competitive sectors they fail to yield improved perfor-
mance. Tariffs discourage competition and are generally second-best incentive devices, so it is not surprising that 
using tariffs as a tool of industrial policy is not effective in the Chinese context. 
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government did not set tariff or subsidy levels higher in cities or industries where 
competition was more intense. The average correlation coefficient between tariffs 
and the Lerner measure is −0.02, suggesting almost 0 correlation between tariffs 
and competition. The correlation with subsidies is positive but close to 0, at 0.03. 
The only instrument where there is significant targeting is taxes, where the correla-
tion with competition is equal to −0.1. The coefficient of −0.1 is suggestive of a 
strong negative association between more initial competition and lower taxes. While 
the evidence in Table 4 is consistent with higher performance as measured by TFP 
when policy instruments are introduced in conjunction with greater competition, 
the actual pattern of policies does not suggest that this is what the Chinese actually 
did. One interpretation is that there is enormous scope for improved performance 
outcomes associated with industrial policy if it is introduced in a way that preserves 
competition in the future.
C. targeting Innovative Enterprises
Should some firms receive more support than others? This is the question we 
address in Table 5. If industrial policies are more effective when they induce greater 
competition between innovating firms, as we are hypothesizing, then it should in 
principle be possible to improve on a purely equitable distribution by targeting firms 
most likely to engage in innovation. The new heterogeneous firm literature pioneered 
by Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz (2003) predicts that the most productive firms are 
also likely to be the largest firms. These firms are also likely, in the heterogeneous 
firm literature, to be the lowest cost and most competitive producers. Consequently, 
one possibility is to redo the analysis with Herfindahls but give greater weight to 
larger enterprises. We report the unweighted results in columns 1 and 2, and the 
results weighting by firm size using number of employees in column 3.
Another way to induce greater competition is to promote new entry and encourage 
younger firms to enter. To capture the importance of entry, we redo the Herfindahls 
and weight the individual subsidy, interest, and tax holiday allocations by the inverse 
of a firm’s age. Effectively, this means giving the greatest weight to the youngest 
firms. These results are reported in column 4 of Table 5.
The results in Table 5 suggest that in the Chinese case, targeting younger but not 
bigger firms significantly increases the positive impact of industrial policies on total 
factor productivity.14 For subsidies, the coefficient on the Herfindahl increases by 
a factor of 3. The coefficient estimate, at 0.10, indicates that a 1 standard deviation 
increase in the Herfindahl would increase a firm’s TFP by 3 percentage points. One 
reason why targeting younger firms may be more beneficial is that younger firms 
generally have higher TFP (measured either using the OP procedure or OLS with 
firm fixed effects).
One potential pitfall of measuring process innovation using total factor produc-
tivity is when output is calculated using sector deflators with firm-level revenue. 
This revenue-based TFP is potentially misleading because it could reflect changes 
14 This is consistent with the analysis in Acemoglu et al. (2013). 
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Table 5—The Impact of the Competitiveness of Industrial Policies on Firm TFP:  
Weighted Herfindhal
Variables
TFP_OLSFE
(1)
TFP_OP
(2)
TFP_OP
(3)
TFP_OP
(4)
CompHerf_subsidy 0.0305*** 0.0319***
(0.00824) (0.00918)
CompHerf_tax 0.0859*** 0.0861***
(0.0230) (0.0249)
CompHerf_interest 0.0568*** 0.0669***
(0.0164) (0.0190)
Comp_Herfsubsidy_weightsize 0.0255***
(0.00909)
Comp_Herftax_weightsize 0.0555***
(0.0124)
Comp_Herfinterest_weightsize 0.0616***
(0.00983)
Comp_Herfsubsidy_weightage 0.102***
(0.0313)
Comp_Herftax_weightage 0.0781***
(0.0255)
Comp_Herfinterest_weightage 0.0541**
(0.0253)
Lerner 10.26** 12.05* 12.72** 12.62**
(4.535) (6.102) (6.253) (6.262)
Lernersquare −5.953** −6.464* −6.813* −6.760*
(2.493) (3.344) (3.420) (3.424)
Index_subsidy 0.0105*** 0.00674*** 0.00781*** 0.00786***
(0.00190) (0.00199) (0.00198) (0.00196)
Index_tax 0.0205*** 0.0200*** 0.0201*** 0.0200***
(0.00108) (0.00103) (0.00104) (0.00105)
Index_interest −0.0120*** −0.0101*** −0.0100*** −0.0100***
(0.00169) (0.00192) (0.00191) (0.00192)
Exportshare_sector 0.343** 0.660*** 0.672*** 0.673***
(0.141) (0.178) (0.179) (0.179)
Stateshare 0.00301 0.00315 0.00273 0.00289
(0.00504) (0.00514) (0.00516) (0.00511)
Constant −2.776 −4.154 −4.474 −4.521
(2.133) (2.858) (2.936) (2.944)
Observations 746,304 746,304 747,158 746,740
r 2 0.208 0.184 0.182 0.182
notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. For column 1, the dependent variable is 
TFP (estimated by OLS with fixed effects); in columns 2, 3, and 4, TFP is estimated by OP as described in the 
text. Each regression includes firm fixed effects and year dummies. CompHerf_subsidy, CompHerf_tax, and 
CompHerf_interest are Herfindhal indices of subsidy, tax, and interest rate policies, measured on the city-in-
dustry-year level. Columns 1 and 2 use an unweighted Herfindhal index, column 3 computes a Herfindhal index 
weighted by firm size (number of employees), and column 4 weights the Herfindhal index using 1/age (year since 
establishment). Export share is calculated by export procurement divided by industrial sales. State share is defined 
as the proportion of the firm’s state assets to its total equity. Those two shares are aggregated at the sector-year level. 
Index_subsidy, index_tax, and index_interest are dummy variables which equal to one if a firm receives subsidies, 
tax breaks, or a  below-median borrowing interest rate, respectively. Sector FDI and tariff measures are included 
but not reported.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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in firm-specific quality or markups. One solution exists when firm-specific price 
deflators are available, which account for price heterogeneity (due to market power 
differences or quality differences) across firms. For the Chinese industrial census 
data, such firm-specific deflators are available for the years 1998 through 2003. 
Consequently, we redo the results presented in Table 5 with this shorter time series, 
using the firm-specific price deflators to calculate first output and then TFP. The 
results using firm-specific price deflators to calculate TFP are reported in Table 6.
The sample size using the earlier years is considerably smaller, at only a quarter 
of the full sample. However, the results are quite robust. The coefficient on the sub-
sidy Herfindahl, calculated using the OP procedure, increases from 0.03 in Table 5 
to 0.06, a doubling of magnitudes. The coefficients for the dispersion of tax holidays 
and low interest loans also increase significantly. The evidence suggests that using 
a much smaller sample and implementing firm-specific prices magnifies the effects 
significantly.
Another potential concern is the possible mismeasurement of TFP using  OP 
when policies are omitted in the first stage. Recent developments in the productivity 
literature suggest that excluding policies in the first stage could lead to biased esti-
mates in the first stage of OP, which estimates input share coefficients. To test for 
this possibility, we redid the analysis adding all the key policies in the first stage, 
and report the results in the last two columns of Table 6. The coefficients on the 
herfindahl terms remain significant and even more important in magnitude than the 
original specification reported in Table 4. The evidence in Table 6 suggests that our 
results emphasizing the positive impact of dispersion on productivity are robust to 
many different specifications and subsamples.
D. Within-Firm versus Across-Firm reallocation Effects of Industrial Policy
In recent years, applied productivity researchers have shifted their focus away 
from the determinants of changes in behavior within the same firm to address mar-
ket share reallocation across firms and the consequences for aggregate productivity. 
This shift in focus can be traced to the work of Olley and Pakes (1996), who pro-
pose a simple approach to disentangling within versus between components. The 
interest in within versus between firm reallocation also increased with the work 
of Hopenhayn (1992), Melitz (2003), and others, who assume that firms have a 
 predetermined exogenous productivity draw, and that consequently much of indus-
try productivity growth is not through learning within a firm but through realloca-
tion of market shares across firms.15
Tables 4 through 6 explored the extent to which within-firm productivity gains 
were affected by how different types of industrial policies were allocated across 
firms. In Table 7, we explore reallocation toward more productive enterprises. This 
15 The empirical work in this area has somewhat lagged behind the theoretical contributions. One of the first 
to apply the Olley and Pakes (1996) decomposition was Pavcnik (2003), who found that reallocation accounted 
for up to two-thirds of productivity growth at the industry level and within-firm learning accounted for one-third. 
For India, the results are the opposite: Harrison, Martin, and Nataraj (2013) find that most of industry productivity 
growth is due to within-firm effects and almost none is due to market share reallocations. This result for India is 
corroborated by work by Sivadasan (2010). 
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in turn requires a measure of TFP at the sector level. We recalculate our measure of 
TFP at the city-sector-year level, and execute the same specification as in Table 4 
using these more aggregate reallocation terms. The results are reported in Table 7. 
Now, instead of focusing on whether industrial policies encourage the same firm 
over time to innovate more, we focus on whether industrial policies encourage real-
location of market shares toward the more productive enterprises. One can think of 
Table 6—Competitiveness of Industrial Policies and Firm Productivity: 
Robustness Check with TFP Calculated by Firm-Level Price Deflator and TFP 
Modified to Include Policies in First-Stage OP Estimation
Using firm-level prices Adding policies in first-stage OP
Variables
TFP_OLSFE
(1)
TFP_OP
(2)
TFP_OLSFE
(3)
TFP_OP
(4)
CompHerf_subsidy 0.0325** 0.0560** 0.0306*** 0.0427***
(0.0150) (0.0228) (0.00857) (0.0109)
CompHerf_tax 0.0497 0.126** 0.0857*** 0.111***
(0.0387) (0.0568) (0.0234) (0.0285)
CompHerf_interest 0.0341 0.0920** 0.0573*** 0.0876***
(0.0299) (0.0437) (0.0172) (0.0230)
Lerner 17.42*** 21.61** 10.19** 10.09**
(5.885) (8.681) (4.554) (4.179)
Lernersquare −9.200*** −11.22** −5.902** −5.474**
(3.283) (4.793) (2.499) (2.317)
Exportshare_sector 0.506 0.354 0.350** 0.606***
(0.423) (0.610) (0.146) (0.205)
Stateshare 0.0119 0.0147 0.00319 0.00107
(0.00929) (0.0108) (0.00503) (0.00411)
Index_subsidy 0.0110*** 0.0101** 0.0104*** 0.0107***
(0.00325) (0.00383) (0.00191) (0.00184)
Index_tax 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 0.0204*** 0.0219***
(0.00206) (0.00218) (0.00108) (0.000902)
Index_interest −0.0109*** −0.0162*** −0.0120*** −0.0161***
(0.00248) (0.00322) (0.00173) (0.00185)
Observations 182,248 182,248 746,304 962,076
r 2 0.082 0.129 0.207 0.191
notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. Regressions in the first 
two columns are based on a subsample of firms existed for all years between 1998 and 2003. 
We use this subsample in order to calculate the TFP using firm-level price-deflator, which is 
calculated by current value of output divided by constant value of output. The dependent vari-
able is TFP (estimated by OLS with fixed effects in columns 1 and 3; estimated by Olley-Pakes 
method in columns 2 and 4). Each regression includes firm fixed effects and year dummies. 
CompHerf_subsidy, CompHerf_tax, and CompHerf_interest are Herfindhal indices of subsidy, 
tax, and interest rate policies, measured on the city-industry-year level. Export share is calcu-
lated by export procurement divided by industrial sales. State share is defined as the proportion 
of the firm’s state assets to its total equity. Those two shares are aggregated at the sector-year 
level. Index_subsidy, index_tax, and index_interest are dummy variables that equal to one if 
a firm receives subsidies, tax breaks, or a below-median borrowing interest rate, respectively. 
Other controls include horizontal and vertical FDI shares and input and output tariffs, but the 
coefficients are not reported in this table. Columns 3 and 4 include policy variables above in the 
first stage of the OP estimation, which estimates factor share coefficients.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table 7—Competitiveness of Industrial Policies and Reallocation
Variables
TFP_OLSFE
(1)
TFP_OP
(2)
TFP_OLSFE
(3)
TFP_OP
(4)
TFP_OLSFE
(5)
TFP_OP
(6)
CompHerf_subsidy −0.0116*** −0.0108***
(0.00207) (0.00194)
CompHerf_tax 0.0283*** 0.0173***
(0.00576) (0.00494)
CompHerf_interest 0.0528*** 0.0496***
(0.00431) (0.00426)
Comp_Herfsubsidy_ −0.00199 0.00223
 weightsize (0.00598) (0.00571)
CompHerf_tax_weightsize 0.0175** 0.00853
(0.00806) (0.00764)
CompHerf_interest_ 0.0667*** 0.0617***
 weightsize (0.00712) (0.00659)
CompHerf_subsidy_ 0.0668*** 0.0536***
 weightage (0.00776) (0.00728)
CompHerf_tax_weightage 0.0892*** 0.0743***
(0.00590) (0.00648)
CompHerf_interest_ 0.100*** 0.0880***
 weightage (0.00573) (0.00665)
Lerner 1.202*** 1.082*** 1.226*** 1.095*** 1.121*** 1.008***
(0.305) (0.273) (0.319) (0.282) (0.310) (0.275)
Lernersquare −0.807*** −0.720*** −0.819*** −0.725*** −0.759*** −0.676***
(0.187) (0.167) (0.195) (0.171) (0.189) (0.167)
Exportshare_sector 0.0156 0.00170 0.0127 0.00173 0.0195 0.00620
(0.113) (0.106) (0.115) (0.106) (0.112) (0.104)
Stateshare −0.0775 0.0168 −0.0596 0.0317 −0.0792 0.0157
(0.0962) (0.0956) (0.0991) (0.0977) (0.0993) (0.0980)
Index_subsidy 0.000158 −0.00416 0.00754* 0.00432 0.0286*** 0.0202***
(0.00387) (0.00353) (0.00410) (0.00378) (0.00507) (0.00469)
Index_tax −0.00263 −0.00148 −0.00264 −0.00201 −0.00355 −0.00279
(0.00234) (0.00203) (0.00242) (0.00215) (0.00234) (0.00207)
Index_interest 0.00671** 0.00637** 0.0125*** 0.0118*** 0.0157*** 0.0145***
(0.00288) (0.00279) (0.00296) (0.00284) (0.00297) (0.00288)
Constant −2.539*** −2.417*** −2.622*** −2.494*** −2.696*** −2.553***
(0.199) (0.231) (0.198) (0.230) (0.200) (0.234)
Observations 64,455 64,455 64,455 64,455 64,455 64,455
 r  
2 0.080 0.068 0.069 0.060 0.093 0.079
notes: Robust clustered standard errors are presented in parentheses. The dependent variable is a measure of 
between-firm reallocation of TFP (estimated by OLS with fixed effects in columns 1, 3, and 5; estimated by 
Olley-Pakes method in columns 2, 4, and 6). CompHerf_subsidy, CompHerf_tax, and CompHerf_interest are 
Herfindhal indices of subsidy, tax, and interest rate policies, measured on the city-industry-year level. Columns 1–2 
use unweighted Herfindhal indices, columns 3–4 are based on Herfindhal indices weighted by firm size (num-
ber of employees), and columns 5–6 calculate Herfindahl indices weighted by 1/age (year since establishment). 
Each regression includes industry fixed effects and year dummies. Export share is calculated by export procurement 
divided by industrial sales. State share is defined as the proportion of the firm’s state assets to its total equity. Those 
two shares are aggregated at the sector-year level. Index_subsidy, Index_tax, and Index_interest are defined as the 
share of firms within each city-industry-year receiving subsidies, tax breaks, or below-median interest rates, respec-
tively. All specifications include sector-level FDI controls.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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this as exploring the extensive margin of productivity growth rather than the inten-
sive margin, which focuses on improvements in firm performance within the same 
firm over time.
The first two columns of Table 7 report the relationship between the reallocation 
component of industry-city-level production and our policy measures. Column 1 
reports the measures when TFP is calculated using OLS with firm fixed effects, and 
column 2 reports the OP estimates. The results indicate that while a broader distribu-
tion of low interest loans and tax holidays are significantly and positively associated 
with greater productivity improvements due to reallocation toward more productive 
firms, the unweighted results for subsidies are negative. Taken together with our 
earlier results, we can conclude that while low interest policies were not effective 
in contributing to within-firm improvements in innovation, they did encourage real-
location of market share toward more innovative firms. Low interest policies and a 
broader dispersion of tax holidays contributed to the extensive margin of productiv-
ity growth. The same is not true for subsidies, which appear to have operated more 
at the intensive margin, inducing within firm productivity improvements.
The next four columns of Table 7 report the outcomes when we weight industrial 
policy by firm size or the inverse of age. The results indicate that the impact of 
subsidies switch from negative to positive, suggesting that they can play a positive 
role in encouraging the reallocation component of TFP growth if they are directed 
at younger or larger enterprises.16 As with the earlier results, the largest impact on 
TFP occurs when industrial policies are oriented toward younger enterprises. The 
last two columns of Table 7 show significant TFP gains from reallocation of market 
share when subsidies, tax holidays, and low interest loans are focused on younger 
enterprises.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we have argued that sectoral state aid can foster productivity growth 
to a larger extent when it targets more competitive sectors and especially when it is 
not concentrated on one or a small number of firms within the sector.
Thus, using a comprehensive dataset of all medium and large enterprises in China 
between 1998 and 2007, we show that industrial policies (subsidies or tax holidays) 
that are allocated to competitive sectors (as measured by the Lerner Index) or allo-
cated in such a way as to preserve or increase competition (e.g., by inducing entry 
or encouraging younger enterprises), have a more positive and significant impact on 
productivity or productivity growth.
If we focus on the intensive margin of within-firm behavior, spreading these 
instruments across more firms is associated with positive productivity increases at 
16 One question which arises is to what extent TFP growth in China reflects primarily increases in average firm 
productivity versus reallocation of market shares. In the Chinese case, only 5 percent of industry level TFP reflects 
the reallocation component, as reported in Appendix Table A2 The small role of market share reallocation under-
scores the importance of focusing on individual firm-level productivity changes, which has been the focus of most 
of our analysis. While market share reallocation has increased during the sample period, it is significantly smaller 
than in countries like the United States. The predominance of firm level productivity as accounting for industry level 
performance for China was also highlighted by Loren Brandt and his coauthors. 
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the firm level. Even greater benefits, leading to a doubling or tripling of the effects, 
is associated with allocating more benefits to more competitive (i.e., typically 
younger) firms.
We also find evidence of improved firm performance when industrial policies are 
targeted toward sectors with initially more competition. This is true for subsidies 
and tax breaks as instruments of industrial policy, but not for loans or tariffs. 17
This in turn suggests that the issue should be on how to design and govern sec-
toral policies in order to make them more competition-friendly and therefore more 
growth-enhancing. Our analysis suggests that proper selection criteria together with 
good guidelines for governing sectoral support can make a significant difference in 
terms of growth and innovation performance.
yet the issue remains: how to minimize the scope for influence activities by sec-
toral interests when a sectoral state aid policy is to be implemented? One answer is 
that the less concentrated and more competition-friendly the allocation of state aid 
to a sector, the less firms in that sector will lobby for that aid as they will anticipate 
lower profits from it. In other words, political economy considerations should rein-
force the interaction between competition and the efficiency of sectoral state aid. A 
comprehensive analysis of the optimal governance of sectoral policies still awaits 
further research.
One question that might arise is how this approach can work when there are sig-
nificant economies of scale. We tested the framework in the context of the Chinese 
domestic market, which is large enough to allow producers to exploit scale econ-
omies in most industrial sectors. In a smaller economy, the question of how to 
encourage more focus and rivalry while allowing firms to reap the cost gains from 
exploiting scale economies would have more relevance. In that context, competition 
could be preserved by exposing firms to international rivalry. It is not surprising that 
smaller economies like South Korea were able to exploit the benefits of competi-
tion by forcing firms that received targeted support to compete on global markets. 
Further research exploring the implementation of industrial policy under increasing 
returns remains an avenue for future research.
17 In China, low interest loans and tariffs were associated on net with lower productivity performance of targeted 
manufacturing firms. Not surprisingly, thus allocating higher tariffs or more low interest loans towards more com-
petitive sectors as a result was not associated with improved productivity performance. A main implication from 
our analysis is that the debate on industrial policy should no longer be for or against the wisdom of such a policy. 
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Appendix A
Table A1—Means and Standard Deviations for Variables
Variable Mean
Standard 
deviation Min. Max.
CompHerf_subsidy 0.570 0.337 0 1
CompHerf_tax 0.871 0.196 0 1
CompHerf_interest 0.846 0.204 0 1
Corr_subsidy_lerner 0.0292 0.172 −1 1
Corr_tax_lerner −0.100 0.216 −1 1
Corr_interest_lerner 0.0477 0.198 −1 1
Corr_tariff_lerner −0.0164 0.165 −1 1
Lerner 0.988 0.0257 0.0275 1
Lerner_squared 0.976 0.0476 0.000756 1
Index_subsidy 0.114 0.318 0 1
Index_tax 0.423 0.494 0 1
Index_interest 0.690 0.462 0 1
Export_share 0.175 0.152 0.00634 0.685
Stateshare 0.0215 0.127 0 1
Horizontal_FDI 0.240 0.128 0.000722 0.939
Backward_FDI 0.0741 0.0401 0.00984 0.498
Forward_FDI 0.0987 0.148 0 1.264
lnTariff 2.389 0.472 0.861 4.174
ln_Indirect_tariff 1.971 0.413 0.902 3.230
ln_Input_tariff 2.074 0.638 −1.376 3.099
log of TFP (OLS with firm fixed effects) 2.016 0.448 −0.229 11.49
log of TFP (Olley Pakes) 1.853 0.464 −0.512 11.17
Table A2—Percentage of TFP Increase Due to Reallocation of Market Share  
versus Average Firm Productivity Increases
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation
1999
 Reallocation share (OLS with fixed effects) 7,714 0.0359349 0.0509876
 Average firm productivity (OLS with fixed effects) 7,714 0.9640651 0.0509876
 Reallocation share (OP) 7,714 0.0351037 0.0535686
 Average firm productivity (OP) 7,714 0.9648963 0.0535686
2000
 Reallocation share (OLS with fixed effects) 7,649 0.0389031 0.0538936
 Average firm productivity (OLS with fixed effects) 7,649 0.9610969 0.0538936
 Reallocation share (OP) 7,649 0.0377865 0.0579714
 Average firm productivity (OP) 7,649 0.9622135 0.0579714
2001
 Reallocation share (OLS with fixed effects) 7,872 0.0403249 0.0520197
 Average firm productivity (OLS with fixed effects) 7,872 0.9596751 0.0520197
 Reallocation share (OP) 7,872 0.0389779 0.0533513
 Average firm productivity (OP) 7,872 0.9610221 0.0533513
2004
 Reallocation share (OLS with fixed effects) 8,382 0.0485715 0.0558423
 Average firm productivity (OLS with fixed effects) 8,382 0.9514285 0.0558423
 Reallocation share (OP) 8,382 0.0456245 0.0563391
 Average firm productivity (OP) 8,382 0.9543755 0.0563391
2007
 Reallocation share (OLS with fixed effects) 8,697 0.0552214 0.0572704
 Average firm productivity (OLS with fixed effects) 8,697 0.9447786 0.0572704
 Reallocation share (OP) 8,697 0.0523665 0.0581827
 Average firm productivity (OP) 8,697 0.9476335 0.0581827
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Appendix B
A. Basic setup
Preferences and Production.—We consider a two-period model of an economy 
producing two goods, denoted by  A and  B . Denote the quantity consumed on each 
good by  x A and  x B . The representative consumer has income equal to  2E and utility 
log ( x A ) +  log ( x B ) when consuming  x A and  x B . This means that, if the price of good 
i is  p i , demand for good  i will be  x i = E/ p i . To simplify the writing, we assume 
that  E = 1 throughout this paper.18
The production can be done by one of two “big” firms  1, 2, or by “fringe firms.” 
Fringe firms act competitively and have a constant marginal cost of production of 
c f whereas firms  j = 1, 2 have an initial marginal cost of  c , where  1 >  c f ≥ c . 
The assumption  c f ≥ c reflects the cost advantage of firms  1, 2 with respect to the 
fringe and the assumption  1 > c insures that equilibrium quantities can be greater 
than  1 . Marginal costs are firm-specific and are independent of the sector in which 
production is undertaken.
Innovation.—For simplicity, we assume that only firms  1, 2 can innovate. 
Innovation reduces production costs, but the size of the cost reduction is different 
between the two sectors  A and  B . Without loss of generality, we assume that in sec-
tor  A, innovations reduce production costs from  c to  c/ γ A = c/(γ + δ) , whereas 
in sector  B they reduce costs from  c to  c/ γ B = c/(γ − δ), where  γ − δ > 1 or δ < γ − 1 .
We also make the simple assumption that, with equal probability, each firm can 
be chosen to be the potential innovator. To innovate with probability  q this firm must 
incur effort cost  q 2 /2 . This is like saying that each firm has an exogenous proba-
bility of getting a patentable idea, which then has to be turned into cost reduction 
thanks to effort exerted by the firm.
Competition.—We assume Bertrand competition within each sector unless the 
two leading firms choose the same sector and collude within that sector. Let  φ be 
the probability of the two leading firms colluding in the same sector when they have 
the same cost, and let us assume that when colluding the two firms behave as a joint 
monopoly taking the fringe cost  c f as given. In this case, the expected profit of each 
leading firm with cost  c <  c f is  φ  1 _2  
 c f − c
 ____ c f  since when collusion fails firms compete 
Bertrand.
Industrial Policy via tax/subsidies.—Laissez-faire can lead to diversification 
(different sector choices by the two firms) or focus (same choice, be it  A or  B ). For 
industrial policy we will focus on interventions based on taxes or subsidies that are 
proportional to profit levels, that is on tax levels  t A ,  t B per profit level in sectors  A, B, 
18 As will be soon apparent, the rate of innovation is linear in  E , and except for this size effect, what matters for 
the analysis are the ratios  E/c and  E/ c f . 
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respectively, where  t k < 0 is a subvention and  t k > 0 is a tax.19 We restrict atten-
tion to the case where there is perfect information about  γ i and where the profit is 
net of the cost of innovation.20
Firms can choose to be active in different sectors or in the same sector: we refer 
to the first situation as one of diversity, and the second as one of focus. Under focus, 
both firms choose the better technology  A . Under diversity, one firm (call it firm 1) 
chooses  A and the other (call it firm 2) chooses  B (this is a coordination game and 
which firm ends up with technology  A is random). Diversity is stable if the firm 
ending up with technology  B does not want to switch to technology  A ; otherwise the 
equilibrium is focus. Conditional on this choice firms then decide to invest in order 
to innovate.
Tax/subsidies affect the sectorial choice of activity of firms, for instance, they 
may choose focus rather than diversity. Because the tax applies to total profits, net 
of the cost of investing in order to innovate, the investment level is unaffected by 
the tax rate put in place. Growth, the expected probability of innovation is therefore 
influenced by the variance of taxes across sectors.
We first derive the equilibrium choices under arbitrary tax/subsidy schemes 
 t A ≤  t B (“laissez-faire” being the case  t A =  t B = 0 ) and show the interaction 
between our measure of competition  φ and the growth rate that can be achieved via 
such a tax system. We then identify the growth-maximizing tax/subsidy scheme 
when the planner is subject to a budget constraint.
B. Equilibrium Profits and Innovation Intensities
Diversity.—Under diversity, firm  1 is in sector  A and firm  2 is in sector  B, and 
both firms enjoy a cost advantage over their competitors. Let  e denote the represen-
tative consumer’s expense on sector  A ,  p 1 the price charged by firm  1, and  c f the limit 
price imposed by the competitive fringe.
The representative consumer purchases  x 1 A ,  x f A in order to maximize 
 log ( x 1 A +  x f A ) subject to  p 1  x 1 A +  c f  x f A ≤ e. The solution leads to  x 1 A > 0 only if 
p 1 ≤  c f . The consumer spends  e and since firm  1 ’s profit is  e −  c 1  x 1 A , firm  1 indeed 
chooses the highest price (hence the lowest quantity  x 1 A ) consistent with  p 1 ≤  c f , 
that is  p 1 =  c f . It follows that  x A =  x 1 A and therefore  x A = e/ c f .
The problem is symmetric in the other sector and since the representative con-
sumer has total income  2 , she will spend  1 on each sector, yielding  x A =  x B 
= 1/ c f .
Suppose first that there is no tax/subsidy in this sector. If the firm is not a poten-
tial innovator (which happens with probability  1/2 ), its profit is equal to
  π Dn =   c f − c _____ c f  . 
19 We assume without loss of generality an initial level of taxation equal to zero in each sector. 
20 If the tax/subsidy is on the profit gross of the cost of innovation, then it will also affect the rate at which 
firms innovate. A reduction in the tax rate on gross profits has a similar effect to a subsidy to the marginal cost of 
innovation. 
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If the firm in sector  i is chosen to be a potential innovator, it will get a profit 
margin of  c f −  c __  γ i if it innovates and a profit margin of  c f − c if it does not. Hence, 
the ex ante expected payoff of the firm conditional on being chosen to be a potential 
innovator, and upon choosing innovation intensity  q , is equal to
  π i DI =  max q  q ( c f −  c __  γ i )  x i + (1 − q)( c f − c) x i −  1 _2  q 2 
or
  π i DI ≡  max q  q   γ i − 1 _____ γ i  c x i + ( c f − c) x i −  1 _2  q 2 . 
Using  x i = 1/ c f , the optimal probability of innovation under diversity  q i D , and 
the corresponding ex ante equilibrium profit  π i  D 1  when chosen to be a potential inno-
vator, are respectively given by
(B1)  q i D ≡   γ i − 1 _____ γ i   c __  c f 
and
  π i DI =   ( q i D ) 
2  _____
2
 +   c f − c _____ c f  . 
For further use, we shall denote
  q A D =  q D (δ) ≡  γ + δ − 1 ________γ + δ  c __  c f ,
  q B D =  q D (−δ) ≡  γ − δ − 1 ________γ − δ  c __  c f  .
Overall, the ex ante expected payoff from diversifying on sector  i is
  π i D =  1 _2( π DI +  π i Dn ), 
that is,
  π i D =  1 _4( q i D ) 2 +   c f − c _____ c f  . 
With a tax rate  t on profits in sector  i , the investment in cost reduction is still equal 
to  q i D, but the expected profit of the leading firm in sector  i is
  π i D (t) ≡ (1 − t) π i D . 
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Focus.—Consider first the case with full Bertrand competition within each sector 
( A or  B ). If both leading firms decide to locate in the same sector, it is optimal for 
them to choose the sector with higher growth potential, i.e., sector  A . Under focus, 
the next best competitor for firm 1 is firm 2 rather than the fringe, so the equilibrium 
price is always equal to  c , which is lower than  c f by assumption. Hence, in this case, 
x A = 1/c while  x B = 1/ c f , since the consumer buys from the fringe in sector  B .
Suppose first that there is no tax/subsidy in sector  A . If firm  1 is chosen to be a 
potential innovator, it will get a profit margin of  c −  c ____ γ + δ when it innovates, since 
it will then compete in Bertrand with the other firm and gets the full market share 
1/c . If it does not innovate, it will collude with probability  φ in order to set a price 
c f and split the demand  1/ c f with a profit margin  c f − c ; if collusion fails, the firms 
make zero profit. Hence, the firm that is called to innovate solves
  π FI ≡  max 
q
  q  γ + δ − 1 ________γ + δ + (1 − q)φ  1 _2  
 c f − c
 _____ c f  −  
 q 2  __
2
 .
The optimal choice of  q is then
(B2)  q F ≡  γ + δ − 1 ________γ + δ −  
φ __
2
 
 c f − c
 _____ c f  
and therefore
  π FI =   ( q F ) 2  ____
2
 +  φ __
2
  c f − c _____ c f  . 
If the firm is not chosen to be the innovator, it will get positive profits only if the 
other firm fails and if collusion succeeds, that is, the expected profit is
  π Fn = (1 −  q F )  φ __
2
 
 c f − c
 _____ c f  .
Hence, the expected profit of each firm under focus in sector  A is
  π F =  1 _
2
 π FI +  1 _
2
 π Fn 
  =  1 _
4
( q F ) 2 + (2 −  q F )  φ __
4
 
 c f − c
 _____ c f   .
Note that since the objective functions defining  π FI and  π Fn are increasing in  φ , 
the value functions are increasing in  φ . Now,  q F is an increasing function of  δ but 
is a decreasing function of  φ , and has zero cross-partial variation with respect to 
 δ, φ . It follows that
(B3)   ∂ 2 π F  ____∂ δ ∂ φ =  1 _2  
∂ q F  ___∂ δ  
∂ q F  ___∂ φ −  
∂ q F  ___∂ δ  1 _4  
 c f − c
 _____ c f  ,
 < 0, 
implying that the cross partial between  δ and  1 − φ is positive.
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If we introduce a tax rate of  t in sector  A , the probability of innovation of a firm 
is still  q F , while its expected profit is
(B4)  π F (t) ≡ (1 − t) π F . 
Industry Equilibrium and the role of taxation.—Consider the laissez-faire situ-
ation with  t A =  t B = 0 . Focus will be the industry equilibrium if no firm prefers 
to be active in sector  B , the lowest profit sector, that is, when  π F ≥  π B D. This estab-
lishes Proposition 1, which shows that there exists a cutoff value  δ F (φ) , a decreasing 
function of  φ, such that focus is the industry equilibrium if and only if  δ ≥  δ F (φ) .
Hence, the stronger competition as measured by ( 1 − φ ), the higher the range of 
δ s for which firms will choose diversity.
Putting in place a system of tax/subsidies will modify the industry equilibrium 
since diversity arises in equilibrium only if  (1 −  t B ) π B D > (1 −  t A ) π F , which is 
more difficult to achieve the larger  t B with respect to  t A . We will use as a measure of 
targeting the ratio
(B5)  τ ≡  1 −  t A  _____
1 −  t B , 
the larger  τ is, the higher the “tax holidays” in sector  A with respect to sector  B . It 
should be clear that  τ is sufficient to characterize the incentives of firms to choose 
between diversity or focus. Alternatively,  τ is a measure of the asymmetry in tax 
holidays between the two sectors. Note that tax systems with  τ = 1 are neutral in 
the sense that they do not modify the industry equilibrium since  Δ(φ, 1) =  δ F (φ) .
Tax policies that are targeted toward sector  A , that is, have a higher value of  τ will 
increase the likelihood of focus to be an industry equilibrium. Indeed, the industry 
equilibrium is focus whenever  τ π F >  π B D; the value  Δ(φ, τ) for which there is an 
equality is decreasing in  τ since  π F is increasing in  δ . It follows that targeting makes 
focus more likely, and establishes Corollary 1.
Hence, a larger target ratio  τ increases the range of values of  δ for which there 
will be focus. Alternatively, if  δ <  δ F (φ) , there exists a targeting tax  τ such that 
δ = Δ(φ, τ) ; because  Δ(φ, τ) is a decreasing function of  τ , the lower the value of 
δ , the higher this value of  τ should be.
Industrial Policy, Innovation, and the Level of Per Capita GDP.—Consider first 
the innovation rate under diversity versus focus, and the implication of this compar-
ison for the effect of industrial policy. Focus maximizes the innovation rate if and 
only if it implies a higher innovation rate, namely whenever
  2 q F (φ) >  q D (δ) +  q D (−δ)
 =  ( γ + δ − 1 ________γ + δ +  γ − δ − 1 ________γ − δ )  c __  c f  .
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This condition is more likely to be satisfied the lower  φ, i.e., the more intense the 
degree of within-sector competition, and it always holds for  φ sufficiently small.
Whenever this condition is satisfied, but  δ <  δ F (φ) , one can increase long-run 
growth through a tax/subsidy policy such that  δ > Δ(φ, t) . 
Now consider the effects of industrial policy on the level of output (i.e., the level 
of per capita GDP). If there is diversity, independently of the degree of innovation 
in this sector, the price is  c f , since in each sector the leading firm competes with the 
fringe only: innovation decreases the cost of production but does not affect directly 
the price. Therefore, output under diversity is equal to
(B6)  Y D =  2 __ c f  . 
By contrast, under focus, innovation affects output directly. If there is no innova-
tion, there is a probability  φ that the firms collude and set a price  c f , but if they fail, 
the price will be equal to  c since the two leaders compete in this case. If one firm 
innovates, the price will be equal to  c . Hence, the level of output under focus is
  Y F =   q F  __c + (1 −  q F ) ( φ __ c f +  1 − φ _____c ) 
 =  1 _c − φ(1 −  q F ) ( 1 _c −  1 __ c f  )  .
Therefore moving from diversity to focus increases output (i.e., the level of per 
capita GDP) by
  ΔY =  Y F −  Y D 
 ∝   c f  __c −  φ __2(1 −  q F ) ( 
 c f  __c − 1) −  1,
which is larger the smaller the product  φ(1 −  q F ) . Note that this difference is pos-
itive when  φ = 0 .
Overall, by Corollary 1, an industrial policy taking the form of a taxation on prof-
its targeted toward sector  A , that is,  τ > 1 , will have an effect on innovation and 
the level of per capita GDP, if and only if there would be diversity without targeting 
and  τ is large enough to induce the firms to choose focus. In this case we call the 
 τ -industrial policy effective.
From (B2),  q F is decreasing in  φ , and therefore  φ(1 −  q F ) is increasing in  φ . It 
follows that industrial policy has a bigger impact on growth and output, the lower 
φ : competition and industrial policy , are complements. This discussion proves 
Proposition 2 in the text; an effective  τ -industrial policy has a bigger effect on per 
capita GDP and on innovation in more competitive industries.
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